FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS 1909 (FSR)
REVISED 1912 (LONDON, WAR OFFICE)

Part I, Operations is an instruction book on military procedure and basic tactics, which, in 1909, revolutionized military thinking; defining the doctrine which enabled the British army, in 1914, to contest in a continental war. It was revised in 1912.

Part II, Organisation and Administration is a handbook guide to the command structure and staffing of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914 and thereafter.

Key Facts: In 1914, and in 1918, the British army fought by FSR (Pt.I). This meant:

• A Commander-in-Chief with sole responsibility for strategy
• All generals to be supported by collegiate staffs, collating military intelligence
• All generals to consider all relevant factors before issuing ‘brief’ orders of intent
• Transmitted down the command hierarchy for tactical implementation
• With time allowed for planning and organisation at battalion level
• The aim being not overwhelming numbers, but fire-power superiority
• From concealed artillery, not in the front line, closely supporting infantry
• Who robustly liaise, during battle, using intelligent initiative
• The same principles for defence; in depth, defining outposts and reserves
• The main ethos being: Offensive aggression with all arms cooperation

This contrasts with German infantry doctrine, which, in 1914, demanded that orders, direct from a Commander on the battlefield, be obeyed exactly, anticipating attritional losses.

Contemporary historians are united in saying that Douglas Haig wrote, and implemented FSR. This is not true. G.F.R. Henderson, Gerald Ellison, Henry Wilson and Henry Rawlinson were the principal authors. Haig neither agreed with, nor followed, its tactical doctrine.

But the ‘Old Contemptibles’ did. And their doctrine did not die with them. FSR is intrinsic to the ‘bite and hold’ debate of 1915, the tactical controversies of 1916, success at Messines Ridge and failure at Passchendaele in 1917. Haig was a very good general where he followed FSR in the administration of his army. He was a very bad one, where he ignored its tactical advice in the middle years of the war. Overly simplistic? Of course. Read on!